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What Jeff McMahan means to provide in this essay is a careful and precise account of
individual responsibility in time of war. What he actually provides, I think, is a careful and
precise account of what individual responsibility in war would be like if war were a
peacetime activity. I am not going to dispute the account. Some of it is a little too fine for
my head; I don’t have any clear intuition about the case of the Implacable Pursuer (except
for the intuition that it isn’t a likely case in the world that I know). But I recognize
McMahan’s overall account as a perceptive description of the way we ordinarily, con-
ventionally, I would even say traditionally, assign moral responsibility. I don’t deny its
perceptiveness; I only want to deny its relevance to the circumstances of war. This is, after
all, one of the reasons that we hate war: It is a coercively collectivizing enterprise; a
tyrannical enterprise; it overrides individuality, and it makes the kind of attention that we
would like to pay to each person’s moral standing impossible; it is universally oppressive.
Just war theory is adapted to the moral reality of war, which means that ‘‘justice’’ in the
theory lives, so to speak, under a cloud.
Now, McMahan is against this ‘‘traditional’’ view of war’s reality and therefore he is
opposed, at least initially, to any adaptation to it. He comes to adaptation at the end, and
when he does, it seems to me, he more or less adopts my own view about these matters.
Our disagreement, at the end, may be only terminological. But let’s see what we can make
of his initial opposition to the ‘traditional’ account. The test is this: Can he apply the
individualizing judgments he is committed to make to the actual circumstances of war?
Suppose that he is right about responsibility: What follows? His paper is a bit stingy with
applications – not unlike a lot of philosophical work. The fictional narrative about the
Implacable Pursuer is developed at much greater length than any real-life example. But
there is one historical example in the paper, and I am going to seize on it. I will also provide
an example of my own, to deal with McMahan’s lacunae.
McMahan argues on page 35 that in the first Gulf War, there was an important moral
distinction to be made between the Iraqi Republican Guard and the regular army. The
Guard was an elite volunteer unit, loyal to the regime, and so responsible for the attack on
Kuwait ‘‘to a higher degree’’ than the conscripts of the regular army. And so the American-
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necessary to eliminate the threat” it posed and, at the same time, coalition soldiers were also
required “to accept greater risks to themselves to reduce the harm inflicted on [the]
conscripts.” Note first how far McMahan is in this example from his commitment to
individual responsibility. Surely there were some members of the Guard for whom service
was an offer they could not refuse and who were privately opposed to the invasion of
Kuwait, while there must have been conscripts who were enthusiastic about both the regime
and the invasion. So McMahan does in fact recognize the collectivizing impact of war, but
he limits this to the divisional level, whereas ‘‘traditional’’ theorists accept collectivization
at the level of the army as a whole. But is this limited recognition plausible? Imagine a
battle in which American forces are about to turn the flank of a Republican Guard division,
and some regular army units are rushed into place to protect the flank. It isn’t an actual
case, but it could easily have happened; it isn’t a weird hypothetical. So, how would
McMahan explain to the American soldiers that they have to use minimal force and accept
greater risks over there, even while they are fighting as harshly as is ‘‘necessary’’ over
here? I would like to listen to his talk to the soldiers.
I don’t believe that he could make the case. What he regards as significant differences of
responsibility between the Guard and the regular army just aren’t going to make a
difference on the battlefield – because of what battlefields are like. I expect that they also
won’t make a difference with regard to the treatment of captured soldiers from the Guard
and the regular army. Both groups will – so, at least, I would hope – be accorded
‘‘benevolent quarantine for the duration.’’ What we might call the surrender convention is a
reciprocal agreement that is obviously of benefit to both sides. But it also fits nicely with
the ‘‘traditional’’ argument about the moral equality of soldiers.
Another historical example, my own this time, will illuminate the meaning of this equality.
McMahan contends (see page 25) that the argument about equality serves only to provide
excuses for the bad guys, the ones fighting an unjust war. These may be good excuses (they
would have to be examined in each individual case to know that), but they don’t justify what
the bad guys are doing. They only mitigate their guilt or their responsibility for doing it. So
consider a case where justification was impossible but excuses really mattered and were taken
seriously: The trials of Dutch collaborators after the Second World War. There were
thousands of these trials, and in each, mitigating circumstances were taken into account; each
collaborator was treated as an individual – and this was surely the right thing to do. So why
didn’t we do anything similar, or even think of doing anything similar, with regard to German
soldiers who fought, say, in Russia (or anywhere else), or with Italian soldiers who fought in
Ethiopia or Albania or Greece? In contrast to the Dutch collaborators, who had individual
excuses, we took these soldiers to have a collective excuse. In fact, I don’t think that
‘‘excuse’’ is the right word here; I only want to insist that even in McMahan’s usage, the
soldiers’ excuse functions differently than excuses normally do, because of the circumstances
of war. It doesn’t require or even invite the same kind of individual examination. Why not?
The Dutch collaborators were breaking with their own people, breaking solidarity,
choosing the Nazis instead. This was a bad choice, and they were compelled to explain
themselves, one by one. The soldiers in all the other cases were doing the done thing, what
everybody else was doing, what their parents and friends, teachers and pastors, and the
leaders of their country, insisted was the right thing to do – and so in fact we didn’t compel
them to explain themselves, one by one. Once again, we collectivized their legal and moral
status. In fact, we treated them very much like McMahan would have treated the conscripts
in Saddam Hussein’s army. But I don’t think that conscription makes the difference or,
better, we have to recognize that there are many ways, not only legally coercive ways, in
which young people are conscripted into the army of their country.
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Finally, I need to say something about the civilian collective. McMahan argues that it
isn’t a collective and that the responsibility of civilians differs just as the responsibility of
soldiers differs, from case to case. But, again, we need to ask what difference the dif-
ferences make. Since he doesn’t believe that civilians who voted for the government that is
fighting the unjust war can be killed, he is going to have the same view of, say, bombing
urban residential areas that ‘‘traditional’’ theorists have. Maybe if we invented a bomb that
killed only adult war-mongers, some ‘‘traditional’’ theorists might change their minds about
bombing residential areas. But military technology isn’t adapted to that kind of
individualizing perspective; it is instead a key instrument in the tyranny of war. Because
of that tyranny, McMahan also isn’t going to allow the terrorist bomb on the bus or in the
café. I read him, instead, as endorsing targeted killing. Now, the ‘‘traditional’’ view of
targeted killing is that it’s much better than random or indiscriminate killing. Beyond that,
we have to argue about each target: What are the grounds for pulling this particular person
out of the civilian collective? I think that I would require a much stronger case than
McMahan would; he seems inclined to be permissive, but I may misread him here. It would
be nice to look at some examples.
I don’t think that the effort to tell the moral story of war and warfare in terms of
individual responsibility is going to work – that is, it’s not going to do any work on the
ground. The story can be told, but I don’t see how it impacts on the actual course of the
battles (or, for that matter, on the aftermath of the battles). McMahan seems finally to
accept this view. He claims at the end of his essay that war is governed by two sets of
principles: One is the “deep morality of war,” and the other is the war convention, which is
reflected in the “traditional” theory. At this point, our disagreement seems minimal. I
believe that McMahan’s “deep morality” is simply our ordinary morality, and that the
conventions represent the adaptation of this morality to the circumstances of war. Now we
might argue about whether ordinary morality provides a critical standard for the war
convention. Of course, it does. But we can’t apply the standard without attending far more
closely than McMahan seems prepared to do to the moral reality of war.
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